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Abstract Cooperatives differ in their intensity of horizontal and vertical communica-
tions, their innovation policies, and their centralization of decision-making power. We
aim to establish relationships between these communication, innovation, and
decision-making aspects of cooperatives, and to identify the circumstances when a
particular configuration adds most value. Horizontal and vertical communications are
analyzed in a decentralized and centralized cooperative. Horizontal communica-
tion (HC) is characterized as the exchange of information between farmers in
the society of members. It is associated with process innovation. Vertical
communication (VC) is the exchange of information between a member and the
CEO of the cooperative enterprise. It is associated with product innovation. The
CEO decides regarding the deliveries of the member and the level of vertical
communication in the centralized cooperative, while these decisions are taken
by the members in the decentralized cooperative. We establish that the
decentralized cooperative is efficient at an intermediate level of the VC cost
coefficient and when the HC cost coefficient is above a certain level, while the
centralized cooperative is efficient in the other cases.
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Introduction
The organizational communication literature establishes that communication is one
crucial element of organizational governance (Christensen and Cornelissen 2011;
Jablin and Putnam 2001). White (1997) states that organizations can themselves be
regarded as communication structures. Organizations cannot exist without communi-
cation, i.e., they come into existence in the interaction that takes place between
organizational members and as a result of the communication between them. The
wholeness of an organization shows a consistent and coherent image of what the
organization is. Communication brings every part of the organization to the same level
of understanding and therefore allows the organization to achieve consistency and
coherence (Schultz et al. 1994).
This paper analyses communication in cooperatives. A cooperative is an enterprise
collectively owned by a society of members having a transaction relationship with it
(Helmberger and Hoos 1962; Hendrikse and Feng 2013; Robotka, 1947). The cooper-
ative’s main function is to process the products from its members and then sell them to
the customers. However, members are themselves business enterprises and economic
units. An agricultural cooperative is therefore an enterprise collectively owned (vertical
relationship) by an association of many independent upstream agricultural producer
enterprises (horizontal relationship). Communication is essential to keep the coopera-
tive working in the members’ interests. Members who lack understanding of its
practices are likely to have a negative attitude towards their cooperative, and this
may cause poor performance (Goodman 1994). Not only the communication among
the members themselves but also the communication between the members and the
cooperative management is important (Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, and Omta 2013).
Cremer, Garicano, and Prat (2007) and Garicano and Wu (2012) provide an orga-
nizational economics explanation of communication within an organization. They
distinguish HC and VC. HC is defined as peer-to-peer communication among special-
ists with common codes, or overlapping knowledge, to share information in order to
solve problems efficiently which cannot be done by a single specialist with limited
knowledge. VC is defined as communication between the peers and an external higher
up Btranslators.^ Only when the knowledge is beyond the field of the specialists and
costly to codify, does VC become necessary to facilitate the matching between
problems and solutions. Patrucco (2008) also mentioned that the technical communi-
cation between the internal investments in R&D and the technologies provided by an
external party is a crucial strategy for increasing returns in the production of knowledge.
These two types of communication have an impact on different parts of the supply
chain. HC is defined as the information exchange between farmers about their produc-
tion methods. Farmers communicate with each other to share their production knowl-
edge. This may decrease their own (marginal) production costs at the upstream stage of
production. From the innovation perspective, this belongs to individual (small scale)
innovation (Pelz et al. 1978). We associate, therefore, HC with process innovation. VC
is the communication between the members (the farmers with superior production
knowledge) and the CEO (with superior marketing experience). When the cooperative
takes more responsibilities for the product than simply product sale, product innovation
is gradually taken over by the CEO. Production innovation activities include quality
control and development of new varieties in order to increase the price and demand in
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the market at the final stage of production. From the innovation perspective, this
belongs to group (big scale) innovation (Pelz et al., 1978). We associate, therefore,
VC with product innovation. Specifically, the farmers and the CEO exchange infor-
mation about the development of the product. On the one hand, the CEO organizes the
research regarding the product from the customer perspective and sets up a research
unit to develop the new production method. He is important in deciding what the
farmers produce and then shares the technological knowledge with the farmers. On the
other hand, the farmers provide feedback from the field, and collaborate with the CEO
regarding product development. To summarize, the concept of HC and VC in this paper
relates to two perspectives: (1) HC and VC reflect the horizontal relationship and
vertical relationship in a cooperative organization and (2) HC and VC contribute to
different types of innovation.
Observing the history of agricultural cooperatives, many governance structures have
been adopted in this organization. Bijman et al. (2013) discuss the governance structure
in cooperatives regarding the allocation of decision right between the board of directors
(representing the members) and the professional management. Chaddad and Iliopoulos
(2013) also address the delegation of formal and real authority to non-patron, profes-
sional managers as a key to improving the efficiency of collective decision-making in
cooperatives. In this paper, we study communication in two structures: decentralized
and centralized cooperatives. We define (de)centralization in terms of the allocation of
decision rights regarding innovation and production. Farmers decide regarding their
own product innovation and production in a decentralized structure, while the farmers
authorize the CEO to make product innovation and production decisions for the
cooperative in a centralized structure.
Alonso et al. (2008) compare centralized and decentralized coordination when
managers communicate strategically. They distinguish HC as communication between
the division managers and VC as communication between the division managers and
the headquarter. Moreover, HC emerges when coordination is decentralized, while VC
emerges when coordination is centralized. The result shows that a higher need for
coordination can improve HC in a decentralized structure but goes at the expense of
centralization benefits. Specifically, under decentralization an increase in the need for
coordination makes the managers more willing to listen to each other to avoid costly
coordination failures. In contrast, under centralization, when coordination becomes
more important, the headquarter increasingly ignores the division managers’ infor-
mation about their own divisions. This induces each manager to exaggerate his case
more, which, in turn, leads to less information being exchanged. Unlike Alonso et al.
(2008), we propose HC and VC exist in both structures, and we compared the level of
HC and VC in the two structures. Moreover, we relate HC and VC to process and
product innovation.
We examine how HC and VC contribute to process and product innovation and how
it differs between decentralized and centralized cooperatives. The role of VC is to
increase final product demand by product innovation, while HC leads to upstream
process innovation by decreasing production cost. The conceptual model linking the
variables is presented in Fig. 1. It is in line with the framework presented by
(Williamson 2000) in the sense that short run decisions are embedded in long run
decisions. However, we provide more details by highlighting and positioning the role
of communication. Two questions are addressed. First, how do the communication and
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production decisions differ between the two governance structures? Second, what
determines the efficient governance structure? In order to answer these questions, we
develop a three-stage non-cooperative model with two farmers and a CEO. In the first
stage, the efficient governance structure is determined; in the second stage, the HC and
VC levels are decided; in the last stage, the production level is determined.
The paper is organized as follows. The BDe Producent and Harvest House^ section
presents two cases of cooperatives to illustrate the relevance of different communica-
tion structures. The BModel^ section presents the model regarding HC and VC. The
BEquilibrium^ section derives the equilibrium production and communication levels,
and determines the efficient governance structure. The BDe Producent Versus Harvest
House^ section relates the two cases to the model. Finally, conclusions are formulated
in BConclusion and Future Research.^
De Producent and Harvest House
We present a description of two cooperatives to illustrate the relevance of different
types of innovation, communication, and the relationship with decision-making.1
De Producent
De Producent is a cheese cooperative. The turnover of De Producent was around 11
million euros in 2013. De Producent consists of 40 large members and 10 small, not
active members. The membership is therefore homogeneous. They are individual
farmers located in a radius of 100 km around Gouda. The dairy farmers produce their
1 We visited cooperative De Producent on April, 28, 2014 and talked with the director Jacco Bot. We visited
cooperative Harvest House on January 23, 2015 and talked with general director Jelte van Kammen and
financial director Fons van der Vleuten.
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Fig. 1 Conceptual model
own cheese, while the storage/processing of the cheese and the transportation of the
cheeses to wholesalers and retailers are done by the cooperative.
The decision structure of this cooperative can be characterized as centralized. The
current general manager is not a farmer member. Instead, he is a professional manager
with years of experience in the agricultural industry. Substantial decision power is
delegated to the general manager, including the day-to-day operational decisions and
the decision of whether to increase the cheese delivery of a member in the next year. He
formulates a proposal regarding the retained earnings percentage, which is to be
approved in the General Assembly meeting. The members are obligated to deliver
100 % of their cheese to the cooperative. This bylaw has been in place since the birth of
the cooperative. However, the general manager mentioned that BI am not a policeman.^
If outside delivery is detected, the management will just talk to the member and no
financial punishment is imposed.
The cooperative pays substantial attention to product innovation. The cheese quality
is independently checked by two full-time employees based on three criteria: shape,
taste, and consistency. The quality is also monitored. Each farm is checked approxi-
mately 2 full days a year by the two employees, and quality improvement advice is
provided by a quality enhancement program. Via these measures, the cooperative helps
members to improve the production process at the farm. Next to the quality innovation,
a research team is organized for developing new products with new flavors. Usually,
the cooperative will select two members to trial the production of a new product. After
that, it spreads the production technology to all members.
There is a lot of communication between the general manager and the members, i.e.,
VC is intense. The cooperative sends a Bweekly quality form^ to every farmer. According
to the general manager, Bthe cooperative is transparent about everything and farmers can
check everything.^ The general manager spends 50 % of his time in communicating with
the members, largely via phone calls and farm visits. The members do not like to use the
Internet. The members trust the general manager/cooperative and share information with
the cooperative. An important reason is that developing specialty cheeses has become
financially very attractive, and therefore, product innovation has gained in importance.
The 40 active members know each other, but there is not much communication and
information exchange between them. In fact, most of the farms grew to big enterprises in
the past 10∼15 years. Some of them have annual revenue of more than 1 million Euros.
The growing size has limited communication between the farmers. Moreover, the CEO
observes competition between members because everyone wants to deliver more cheese
to the cooperative. It is known from the literature that the larger number of the participants
in one project, the more direct competition among them, and it leads to less information
exchange regarding Bprecompetitive^ data (Prosser, 1995).
Harvest House
Harvest House specializes in vegetables. It has 826 ha under cultivation, and a turnover
of 530 million euros in 2013. The membership consists of four product groups and, in
total, 67 growers. First, there are 52 paprika growers, including 5 large growers.
Second, there are 11 tomato growers, including 5 large growers. Finally, there are 2
cucumber growers and 2 eggplant growers. The membership is therefore heteroge-
neous, within and between product groups.
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The decision structure of this cooperative can be characterized as decentralized. A
lot of decision power is not granted to the CEO by the farmers. The different
product groups organize their own logistics and packaging centers. There is
competition between these centers because they are allowed to choose between
these centers. For instance, if one of the packaging companies within the
cooperative is able to offer a lower price, other growers are free to choose
its services. In this way, the packaging seems to be efficient (Bulow and
Klemperer 1996). Growers decide the quantity to be delivered, and the coop-
erative is obliged to sell them. The management is responsible for the quality
control in the cooperative, but it does not command farmers about how to
resolve a given quality problem. For example, the management may communi-
cate to the grower that his product lacks certain taste characteristics, or may
suffer from early perishability, but will leave it up to the grower to find a
solution. The growers may of course consult with each other regarding such
problems or raise an issue in the product committee. The reason for such
allocation of control is the growers’ better knowledge about the growing
process and technology. Additionally, members are open to other growers’
advice and continuously learn from each other.
Two product groups are set up for product-related matters. When there is a
problem regarding a product, the cooperative does not take the responsibility to
resolve it. The members discuss with each other in order to find a solution
themselves. It generates high commitment and trust in the coop community. It
contributes to improving the products. Therefore, members take the innovation
decisions regarding production processes and product development. For example,
some growers are involved in the product project Agriport A7. Agriport A7 is the
site of a development project for large-scale greenhouse and open-field crop
cultivation. The large-scale production of fresh vegetables, processing, and logis-
tics have been clustered at Agriport A7, and it is considered the most modern
agro-park in the world. Additionally, Harvest House focuses largely on sustain-
ability, which is market-driven.
The coop provides many communication channels. Formally, the General Assembly
meeting is organized two times a year. Once a month, there is a product meeting,
product groups attend the meeting and discuss price and quality and product compe-
tition issues. A newsletter is delivered to every member once a week, to report the
weekly activities. Informally, the CEO visits every member once in a while. Besides, a
digital platform is being built for better interaction within the coop. From the CEO’s
observation, HC is intensive and very much valued. Members themselves communicate
a lot due to that they actively join the organizational activities and make most of the
decisions. VC is relatively low because less information exchange is needed between
the cooperative and the members.
Table 1 summarizes the differences between the two cooperatives.
Model
Consider a cooperative in a monopolistic market. The cooperative consists of a CEO
and two farmer members. There are two types of communication in a cooperative.
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Horizontal communication between farmers is geared towards improving knowledge
regarding the production process, i.e. process innovation. It results in reducing his
production cost. Vertical communication between a farmer and the CEO generates
knowledge regarding product innovation. Product innovation will increase the price of
the products in the market. Figure 2 shows the channels of communication in a
cooperative. There are two types of cooperatives. In the decentralized cooperative,
farmer 1 chooses to communicate (h1) with farmer 2 to improve his knowledge
regarding his production process, i.e., process innovation. It results in reducing his
production cost. The same decision has to be made by farmer 2 (h2). The HC decisions
h1 and h2 are made simultaneously. Meanwhile, farmers 1 and 2 have to choose the
intensity of communication with the CEO (v1 and v2) to obtain knowledge regarding
product innovation. Product innovation will increase the price of the products in the
market. In the centralized cooperative, farmers 1 and 2 choose the intensity of the
communication between each other to enable process innovation, while the CEO
determines the product development by deciding the VC levels (v1, v2) for the
cooperative.
A three-stage game is developed to study HC and VC, innovation, and decision-
making in a centralized and a decentralized cooperative. In the first stage, the gover-
nance structure decentralized (D) or centralized (C) cooperative is determined. In the
second stage, the HC and VC decisions are determined simultaneously. Define hi(vi) as
the level of HC (VC) regarding farmer i, where i = 1, 2. Define h vð Þ as the average level
of horizontal (vertical) communication. The HC decisions are taken by the farmers in
Table 1 De Producent versus Harvest House
Attributes\case De Producent Harvest House
Facts Product Cheese Vegetables
Turnover 2013 €11 million €530 million
#Members 50 67
Assessment Member heterogeneity Low High
Governance structure Centralized Decentralized
Innovation support High Low
HC level Low High
VC level High Low
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Fig. 2 Communication in the cooperative
both cooperatives, while farmers decide VC in the decentralized cooperative and the
CEO is determining VC in the centralized cooperative. In the third stage, the farmers
choose their own level of production independently and simultaneously in the
decentralized structure (q1, q2), while the CEO decides the production level q1 and q2
in the centralized structure. Figure 3 depicts the sequence of decisions.
The market demand function is inspired by the seminal product differentiation
model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), which is summarized by Mérel, Saitone, and
Sexton (2009). It is defined as p ¼ vþ dð Þ −Q, where d(> 0) is the basic demand
parameter and Q (> 0) is the quantity demanded. When v1 (v2) increases, more product
innovation is created, and the consumers are willing to pay more for the new product.
Define the cost of VC as Vi ¼ 12 kv2i , where i = 1, 2 and k is the VC cost coefficient
(k > 0). The second derivative of the cost of VC is Vi
″ = k, i.e., the marginal cost of VC is
increasing. Vi
″ can be interpreted as the discretion of the farmer regarding the choice and
execution of activities between the farm and the cooperative enterprise, like upgrading
deliveries, facilitating transportation, and dealing with intermediate product peculiarities. A
high value of k shows that additional VC is accompanied by a large increase in costs. An
example is a bureaucratic organization (Milgrom&Roberts, 1992, p122). In general, kwill
be smaller as the size of themembership is smaller, or whenmember homogeneity is higher.
The production cost of farmer i is Ci = ciqi. The farmers talk to each other in
order to improve their production process. It decreases their (marginal) production
cost. HC is therefore to be interpreted as process innovation by decreasing the
members’ marginal production cost to ci = A − hi (Falvey, Poyago-Theotoky, and
Teerasuwannajak 2013), where A is a base cost (i.e., the production cost when
there is no process innovation). It is assumed that process innovation cannot
decrease the marginal production cost to zero, i.e., 0 < hi < A. Define the HC cost
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Fig. 3 The three-stage game
function for the farmer i as Hi ¼ 12 rh2i , where r is the HC cost coefficient (r > 0).
The payoff of farmer i is therefore πi ¼ vþ d−Qð Þqi−ciqi− 12 rh2i − 12 kv2i .
Equilibrium
The concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is used to solve the game.We start therefore with
determining the equilibriumproduction levels and communication levels in the BDecentralized
cooperative^ and the BCentralized Cooperative.^ The mathematical details are presented in
the appendix. Comparative statics results are formulated in BCommunication levels.^
Decentralized Cooperative
Production Levels
In the final stage, each farmer determines his optimal production level by maximizing
his own payoff. The first-order condition results in the best-response functions
q1
* q2ð Þ ¼
1
2
d−Aþ vþ h1
 
−
1
2
q2
and
q2
* q1ð Þ ¼
1
2
d−Aþ vþ h2
 
−
1
2
q1:
The quantity competition between the enterprises is reflected in the negative slope of the
reaction functions. Notice that the reaction function of farmer 1 (2) shifts outward as a
function of v1, v2, h1 (h2).
The intersection of the reaction functions determines theNash equilibriumproduction levels:
q*1 ¼
1
3
d−Aþ vþ 2h1−h2
 
and
q*2 ¼
1
3
d−Aþ vþ 2h2−h1
 
:
The best-response functions of farmer 1 and farmer 2 and the equilibrium production
levels are presented in Fig. 4. Notice that q1
* (q2
*) is positively related to v1, v2, h1 (h2),
and negatively related to h2 (h1).
Communication Levels
The communication levels are determined in the second stage of the game. Substituting
q1
*, q2
* into π1
* and π2
*, and maximizing π1
* and π2
* with respect to the communication
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variables h1, h2, v1 and v2 results in four first-order conditions. The equilibrium levels
of communication are
h*1 k; rjDð Þ ¼ h*2 k; rjDð Þ ¼
4 d−Að Þ
r 9−1=kð Þ−4
and
v*1 k; r
D
 
¼ v*2 k; r
D
 
¼ d−Að Þ
k 9−4=rð Þ−1 :
Substituting h1
*, h2
*, v1
*, v2
* into q1
* and q2
*, we obtain theNash equilibrium production levels
q*1 k; r
D
 
¼ q*2 k; r
D
 
¼ 3 d−Að Þ
9−4
.
r−1
.
k
:
Substituting the above results into the payoffs, we obtain the total payoff of the
decentralized cooperative
π* k; r
D
 
¼ π*1 þ π*2 ¼
d−Að Þ2 18−16
.
r−1
.
k
 
9−4
.
r−1
.
k
 2 :
Centralized Cooperative
The VC level is determined by the CEO and the cost is shared equally by the farmers,
while the HC level is determined by each farmer and the cost is paid by each farmer.
The CEO chooses the production levels q1 and q2 in order to maximize the payoff of
the cooperative.
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Fig. 4 Best-response functions
Production Levels
The payoff of the cooperative can be written as
π ¼ π1 þ π2 ¼ vþ d−Qð Þ q1 þ q2ð Þ −c1q1−c2q2− 12 rh21− 12 rh22− 12 k v1 þ v2ð Þ2.
The payoffs of the farmers are
π1 ¼ vþ d−Qð Þq1−c1q1− 12 rh21− 14 k v1 þ v2ð Þ2,
π2 ¼ vþ d−Qð Þq2−c2q2− 12 rh22− 14 k v1 þ v2ð Þ2.
The first-order condition results in the best-response functions
q1
* q2ð Þ ¼
1
2
d−Aþ vþ h1
 
−q2
and
q2
* q1ð Þ ¼ 12 d−Aþ vþ h2ð Þ −q1.
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium outcomes results in
q1
* ¼ q2* ¼ 14 d−Aþ vþ h
 
.
Communication Levels
Substituting q1* and q2* into π, π1, π2, farmers maximize their own payoffs with
respect to h1, h2, while the CEOmaximizes the total payoff with respect to v (v = v1 + v2).
We get from the three first order conditions the equilibrium
h*1 k; rjCð Þ ¼ h*2 k; rjCð Þ ¼
2 d−Að Þ
r 8−1=kð Þ−2
and
v* k; rjCð Þ ¼ 2 d−Að Þk 8−2=rð Þ−1.
Substituting the results back into q1
* and q2
*, we obtain the equilibrium
centralized production level q1
* k; rjCð Þ ¼ q2* k; rjCð Þ ¼ 2 d−Að Þ8−2=r−1=k. Lastly, substi-
tution of the above results in the total payoff of the centralized cooperative
results in π* k; rjCð Þ ¼ 2 d−Að Þ28−2=r−1=k.
To summarize the equilibrium choices and payoffs, we list HC, VC, produc-
tion and profit as functions of r and k in the (de)centralized structure in
Table 2.
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In order to have meaningful result (by having positive values for all variables),
assume that d > A > 0 and the parameters k, r satisfy
1
8
< k≤
1
7
; r >
2k
8k−1
1
7
< k≤
1
6
; r >
4k
9k−1
k >
1
6
; r >
16k
18k−1
8>>><
>>>:
.2
Comparative Statics
This section formulates results regarding the level of production, HC, VC, and profit in
the decentralized and centralized cooperatives. We start with formulating a result
regarding the level of production and profit in the decentralized and centralized
cooperative, given the HC and VC levels. First, the production level in the
decentralized cooperative is 23 d−Aþ vþ h
 
, and it is higher than the production
level 12 d−Aþ vþ h
 
in the centralized cooperative.3 This aligns with the overpro-
duction problem of the decentralized cooperative (Albæk and Schultz 1998). When
farmers are making production decisions, they tend to produce more to achieve a higher
payoff for themselves, ignoring the negative externalities for the entire membership.
Proposition 1 states this result.
Proposition 1 The production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in
the centralized cooperative, given the levels of communication.
The difference between the joint profit of the centralized cooperative and the
decentralized cooperative is 136 d−Aþ vþ h
 
2−kv2, given the HC and VC levels.
Therefore, given the communication levels, the centralized cooperative has a higher profit
than the decentralized cooperativewhen k is small. The benefit of the centralized cooperative
2 Given that d − A > 0, r > 0, k > 0, let both the denominators and the numerators be positive, we achieve
1
8
< k≤
1
7
; r >
2k
8k−1
1
7
< k≤
1
6
; r >
4k
9k−1
k >
1
6
; r >
16k
18k−1
8>>><
>>>:
.
3 The proofs of the propositions are presented in the appendix.
Table 2 Equilibrium choices and payoffs in the decentralized/centralized cooperative
Cooperative Decentralized structure Centralized structure
Production 6 d−Að Þ9−4=r−1=k
4 d−Að Þ
8−2=r−1=k
HC 8 d−Að Þr 9−1=kð Þ−4
4 d−Að Þ
r 8−1=kð Þ−2
VC 2 d−Að Þk 9−4=rð Þ−1
2 d−Að Þ
k 8−2=rð Þ−1
Profit d−Að Þ
2 18−16=r−1=kð Þ
9−4=r−1=kð Þ2
2 d−Að Þ2
8−2=r−1=k
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is the internalization of the negative production externalities of individual profit maximiza-
tion in the decentralized cooperative. However, when k is above a certain level, the
centralized cooperative will have a lower profit than the decentralized cooper-
ative due to the increasing marginal cost of VC. The reason is that the CEO is
doing all the VC in the centralized cooperative and carries all the cost, while each farmer
carries his own VC cost in the decentralized cooperative. The result is formulated in
proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The profit level is higher in the centralized cooperative than in the
decentralized cooperative when k is small, given the levels of communication.
The understanding of the results is facilitated by first addressing the relationship
between VC and production. This is done by taking the HC equal to 0 in both
cooperatives. We present the equilibrium VC, production, and profit levels in the
proposition 3 – 5.
The difference between the level of VC in the centralized and decentralized
cooperative is determined by the trade-off in the decentralized cooperative
between the (unattractive) free riding due to the positive quality enhancement
externality of the VC choices by the members and the (attractive) decentralized
payments of the costs of VC by the members preventing to a certain extent the
increasing marginal cost of VC. However, the first order conditions result in
VCD ¼ 2 d−Að Þ9k−1 and VCC ¼ 2 d−Að Þ8k−1 , i.e. the level of VC is always higher in the
centralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative for all possible
values of the VC cost coefficient k. This result is presented in proposition 3.
The dominance of the free riding effect in determining the level of VC is due
to the specification of the cost function of VC. 4
Proposition 3 presents the result regarding the level of VC.
Proposition 3 The VC level is higher in the centralized cooperative than in the
decentralized cooperative, given the level of HC.
Proposition 1 states that the decentralized cooperative produces more than
the centralized cooperative, given the levels of communication. However, this
result may be reversed when the choice of VC is endogenized. We have
established that the production level is positively related to the average VC
level QD ¼ 23 d−Aþ vDð Þ

; QC ¼ 12 d−Aþ vCð ÞÞ. An investment in VC creates,
therefore, a positive quality enhancement externality. Lower level of VC due to the
free riding in the decentralized cooperative leads to a lower price is paid by
consumers for a unit of the product, and this reduces the incentive to overpro-
duce. When the CEO in the centralized cooperative is not overburdened, i.e. k
4 A straightforward way to illustrate this is to introduce a capacity constraint for individuals regarding the level
of VC. For example, the level of VC in the centralized cooperative is lower than in the decentralized
cooperative when the cost function is Vi ¼ 12 kv2i when k < 3 d−Að Þ2 9k−1ð Þ and Vi =∞ otherwise.
1196 J Knowl Econ (2018) 9:1184–1209
is sufficiently low, then the centralized cooperative produces more than the
decentralized cooperative. This is reflected in the equilibrium output levels QD
¼ 6 d−Að Þ9−1=k and QC ¼ 4 d−Að Þ8−1=k . Specifically, the centralized cooperative produces
more when k < 16. Proposition 4 summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 The production level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative
than in the centralized cooperative when k > <ð Þ 16, given the level of HC.
The profit is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooper-
ative, i.e., d−Að Þ
2 18−1=kð Þ
9−1=kð Þ2 >
2 d−Að Þ2
8−1=k , when k∈
5−
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 ;
5þ ﬃﬃ7p
18
 
. The level of profit of the two
governance structures is determined by a number of factors. The centralized cooperative has
two advantages. First, it internalizes the negative production externalities of decentralized
production decisions by the members (proposition 1). Second, the higher level of VC in the
centralized cooperative than in the decentralized cooperative (proposition 3) results in higher
price per unit sold. However, a higher level of VC is expensive for the centralized
cooperative due to the increasing marginal cost of VC (proposition 2). The high cost of
VC dominates the two advantages when 5−
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 < k <
5þ ﬃﬃ7p
18 , i.e., the decentralized cooper-
ative has higher profits when k is at an intermediate level. Finally, the overproduction
and the underinvestment in VC in the decentralized cooperative dominate the
higher cost of VC in the centralized cooperative when k > 5þ
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 . The reason is
that the equilibrium level of VC is inversely related to k, and therefore, the
total costs of VC are decreasing when k is increasing. Therefore, the centralized
cooperative has the highest profits when k is sufficiently high. The result is
formulated in proposition 5.
Proposition 5 The profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than
in the centralized cooperative when k∈ 5−
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 ;
5þ ﬃﬃ7p
18
 
(otherwise), given the level of HC.
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Fig. 5 Comparison of HC and VC levels in the two governance structures
Next, we address both HC and VC. The next two propositions formulate results
regarding the equilibrium communication levels in the second stage of the game, antic-
ipating the production level decisions in the final stage of the game.
The centralized and decentralized cooperative are identical regarding HC in the sense
that each member chooses its level of HC and pays for the costs. It involves an indirect
negative externality because a higher level of HC reduces the cost of production, and
therefore will result in a higher output level, but the costs of the resulting decrease in the
price paid by the consumers is carried also by the other member. This results in too much
production, and is the (indirect) negative externality in the choice of production due to the
choice of horizontal communication. This effect is qualitatively the same for both cooper-
atives. However, the level of HC differs between the two cooperatives because the VC and
production choices differ between the two cooperatives. Figure 5 presents the comparison
between the two cooperatives regarding their equilibrium communication choices (proof
see appendix).
Next, we compare the equilibrium production level in the two cooperatives. Similar
to proposition 4, both VC and HC counter the overproduction effect. We have shown
that the production level is positively related to both the HC and VC level
QD ¼ 23 d−Aþ vD þ hD
 
; QC ¼ 12 d−Aþ vC þ hC
  
. When k increases, more VC
free-riding problems occur in the decentralized cooperative, and it reduces the produc-
tion. Moreover, when r increases, the indirect negative HC externality is weakened, less
process innovation occurs in both cooperatives, and it reduces the overproduction.
Therefore, the production level decreases in both cooperatives. The centralized coop-
erative produces more than the decentralized cooperative when 6 d−Að Þ9−4=r−1=k <
4 d−Að Þ
8−2=r−1=k,
i.e., k < 2r15r−2. The result regarding the production level is formulated in proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium production level is higher (lower) in the decentralized
than in the centralized cooperative when k > <ð Þ 2r15r−2.
Figure 6 presents proposition 6.
The efficient governance structure is defined as the governance structure creating the
highest value, while taking into account the communication and production level
choices in the second and third stage of the game. When k≤ 5rþ1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r , and r
satisfies r∈ 5þ 3 ﬃﬃﬃ2p =7;∞ , the profit is higher in the centralized cooperative due to
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its two advantages: it internalizes the negative production externalities, it generates a
higher VC level, and it results in a higher price per unit sold. When 5rþ1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r
< k < 5rþ1þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r , and r satisfies r∈ 5þ 3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 
=7;∞
 
, the decentralized coop-
erative has a higher profit level due to the high equilibrium VC level and costs in the
centralized cooperative.When k > 5rþ1þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r , and r satisfies r∈ 5þ 3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 
=7;

∞Þ,
the decentralized cooperative starts suffering from its overproduction and the
underinvestment of the VC, and the loss of surplus is larger than the costly
communication in the centralized cooperative. This makes the centralized cooperative
efficient again. However, when r < 5þ 3 ﬃﬃﬃ2p =7 and regardless of k, the profit
level is always lower in the decentralized cooperative than the centralized
cooperative. This is due to that when r is small, the VC level is lower in the
centralized cooperative, and therefore, the costly VC in the centralized cooperative
becomes insignificant. The advantage of the internalization of the negative production
externalities dominates. The result regarding the efficient governance structure
for all possible values of the communication cost parameters is formulated in
proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than
the centralized cooperative when r∈ 5þ 3 ﬃﬃﬃ2p =7;∞  and k∈ 5rþ1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r ;

5rþ1þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r Þ otherwise).
We present proposition 9 in Fig. 7.
De Producent Versus Harvest House
This section presents the two cooperatives in terms of the parameters of the model.
With the description of the two cooperatives, we formulate the following assumptions
of the four parameters in our model. First, the communication cost coefficients r and k
are higher in Harvest House than in De Producent. This due to the different
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Fig. 7 Comparison of profit levels in the two cooperatives
compositions of the membership of the two cooperatives. There is only one product in
De Producent, while there are four products in Harvest House. Additionally, product
groups in Harvest House have large and small growers, while the farmers owning De
Producent have similar sizes. Therefore, member heterogeneity is higher in Harvest
House than in De Producent. This makes it relatively more difficult to communicate
both horizontally and vertically in Harvest House than in De Producent. However,
Harvest House has separated the tomato group and paprika group in its governance
structure to facilitate the HC. This lowers the parameter r to the level of De Producent.
Moreover, the demand and the fixed production cost have to be considered as well
since they are different in different cooperatives. Due to product differentiation, the
price of cheese (De Producent) is relatively higher than that of vegetables (Harvest
House), and the fixed production cost of cheese (De Producent) is relatively higher than
that of vegetables (Harvest House). Table 3 summarizes these observations regarding
Table 3 Comparison of parameters between De Producent and Harvest House
Member heterogeneity determines: r rH > rP
k kH > kP
Product feature determines: d dH < dP
A AH <AP
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Fig. 8 De Producent and Harvest House in terms of r, k, d, A
the parameters of these two cooperatives, where H represents Harvest House and P
represents De Producent.
Figure 8 presents the two cooperatives in terms of the (relative) values of the four
parameters of the model, taking into account the assumption d > A > 0 and
1
3
< k≤
3
7
;
k
4k−1
< r < 1
3
7
< k < 1;
4k
9k−1
< r < 1
8><
>:
.
In order to compare De Producent and Harvest House, we combine Figs. 7
and 8 to illustrate proposition 7. Due to d-A is constant, Fig. 9 is depicted
with r on the vertical axis and k on the horizontal axis. From Fig. 9, the
parameters of the two cooperatives align with the finding of proposition 7.
When r is lower and k is small, the centralized cooperative is efficient, i.e.,
De Producent. When r is higher and k is in the middle range, the
decentralized cooperative is efficient, i.e., Harvest House.
The different communication levels and governance structures of these two
cooperatives may also be due to the nature of the product and the innovation
strategies. Specifically, the vegetable cooperative has various ways of processing/
packaging. Therefore, HC is more important for improving the process innovation,
and a decentralized structure is adopted to facilitate this. The cheese cooperative has
identical packaging, but various flavors are developed. Therefore, VC and product
innovation are more important for a cheese cooperative, and a centralized structure is
adopted to apply this strategy.
In other cooperatives, the situation may differ. However, we claim that the
general conclusions are applicable: (1) if process innovation is important for the
cooperative, a decentralized governance structure should be adopted to secure the
HC in order to create process innovation. The different communication levels and
governance structures of these two cooperatives may also be due to the nature of
the product and the innovation strategies. Specifically, the vegetable cooperative
has various ways of processing/packaging. Therefore, HC is more important for
J Knowl Econ (2018) 9:1184–1209 1201
0
Harvest House
De Producent
Fig. 9 De Producent versus Harvest House
improving the process innovation, and a decentralized structure is adopted to
facilitate this. The cheese cooperative has identical packaging, but various
flavors are developed. Therefore, VC and product innovation are more impor-
tant for a cheese cooperative, and a centralized structure is adopted to apply
this strategy. In other cooperatives, the situation may differ. (2) If the product
innovation is the focus of a cooperative’s strategy, a centralized governance
structure should be adopted to implement intensive VC, in order to secure
product innovation. In addition, the communication cost has to be considered.
Member heterogeneity and distance of the members are examples that influence
the communication cost. Our results show that when communication costs are
small or large (intermediate), the centralized (decentralized) cooperative is
efficient.
Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, the relationship between communication, innovation, and
(de)centralization in cooperatives is investigated. HC and VC associate with different
types of innovation. HC is related to process innovation, while VC is related to product
innovation. The intensity of the two types of communication depends on the costs of the
two types of innovation. A decentralized cooperative is characterized by the
members taking individually the vertical communication and production deci-
sions, while these decisions are made by the CEO of the cooperative enterprise
in a centralized cooperative. Horizontal communication decisions are made by
members individually in both cooperatives. The decentralized cooperative has a
tendency to overproduce due to the negative production externalities and to
generate insufficient VC due to the positive externalities in the provision of
product quality. An advantage of the decentralized cooperative is that the costs
of VC are carried by the various members, as opposed to the centralized
cooperative in which all VC are generated by the CEO. We find that when
both communication cost coefficients are small and large, the centralized coop-
erative dominates, when both communication cost coefficients are in an inter-
mediate range, the decentralized cooperative dominates.
There are various possibilities for future research. First, the current model provides a
start to model the choice of communication policy of supplier-owned enterprises. In
practice, a much richer menu of communication devices is used and developed to
address a variety of issues. For example, an important theme in cooperatives is the
development of membership policies to foster involvement, commitment, and trust
between the farmers and the cooperative enterprise. These membership policies involve
several means to stimulate HC as well as VC. Another example is social capital in
cooperatives (Deng 2015). Second, VC in our model is a beneficial activity. It is related
to product innovation and increases therefore the product market price. However, other
types of VC are present in cooperatives. Farmers communicate extensively with the
general manager about the transactions between the farm and the cooperative enter-
prise, and the strategy of the cooperative, due to their large financial involvement in the
cooperative. Cook (1995) identifies five general problem sets in cooperatives: free-rider
problem, horizon problem, portfolio problem, control problem, and the influence costs
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problem. At least two of these five problem sets, i.e., the control problem and
the influence costs problem, involve VC. However, the nature of VC in these
problem sets seems to be quite different and requires therefore different model-
ling. Third, research regarding the governance of cooperatives is usually
highlighting the differential incentives of various board models (Bijman et al.
2013). Such research addresses the relationship between a board representing
the members and the professional management of the cooperative enterprise.
However, the relationship between the professional management and the many
individual members in terms of management may be more important in the
creation of value, and is challenging and complex (Cook 1994). Research
regarding the governance of cooperatives will therefore benefit from putting
more emphasis on the managerial importance of developing and implementing
communication policies by distinguishing various types of communication and
recognizing their differential impacts. Finally, we stated at the beginning of the
“De Producent and Harvest House”section that the information about the two
cooperatives are descriptions. These descriptions are valuable because they
signal important phenomena in cooperatives. However, it will be informative
and important to have future research using a rigorous case study methodology
in the collection of data.
Appendix
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative (given HC and VC)
The mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized and
centralized cooperatives given HC and VC are presented in Table 4 below:
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative (given HC)
Similarly, the mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized
and centralized Cooperative without HC are presented in Table 5 below:
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative
The mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized and
centralized Cooperative, see Table 6, are presented below:
Proof Proposition 1 From Table 4 we obtain that given HC and VC, QD ¼ 23
d−Aþ vþ h  and QC ¼ 12 d−Aþ vþ h
 
. We can see that always QD >QC.
Proof Proposition 2 From Table 4 we obtain that given HC and VC, πD ¼ 29
d−Aþ vþ h  2−rh2−kv2 and πC ¼ 14 d−Aþ vþ h
 
2−rh2−2kv2. The difference
between the joint profit of the centralized cooperative and the decentralized cooperative
is 136 d−Aþ vþ h
 
2−kv2 > 0 when VC is 0.
Proof Proposition 3 From Table 5 we obtain that without HC, VD ¼ 2 d−Að Þ9−1=k and
VC ¼ 2 d−Að Þ8−1=k . Therefore, the VC level is always higher in the centralized cooperative
for all possible values of k.
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Proof Proposition 4 From Table 5 we obtain that without HC, QD ¼ 6 d−Að Þ9−1=k and
QC ¼ 4 d−Að Þ8−1=k . The production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than the
centralized cooperative when 6 d−Að Þ9−1=k >
4 d−Að Þ
8−1=k ⇔3 8−
1
k
 
> 2 9− 1k
 
⇔21− 3k > 18−
2
k⇔6
> 1k⇔k >
1
6. Therefore, the production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative
than in the centralized cooperative when k > 1/6.
Proof Proposition 5 From Table 5 we obtain that without HC, πD ¼ d−Að Þ
2 18−1=kð Þ
9−1=kð Þ
2
and πC ¼ 2 d−Að Þ 28−1=k. The profit level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than
in the centralized cooperative when d−Að Þ 2 18−1=kð Þ9−1=kð Þ 2 > 2 d−Að Þ
2
8−1=k⇔ 18− 1k
 
8− 1k
 
> 2 9− 1k
 
2⇔144k2−26k þ 1 > 162k2−36k þ 2⇔18k2−10k þ 1 < 0. T h e
roots of the equation 18k2 − 10k + 1 = 0 are k ¼ 5
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 . Therefore, πD > πC holds when
k∈ 5−
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 ;
5þ ﬃﬃ7p
18
 
. To conclude, the profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized
cooperative than in the centralized cooperative when k∈ 5−
ﬃﬃ
7
p
18 ;
5þ ﬃﬃ7p
18
 
(otherwise).
Proof regarding the equilibrium communication levels (Fig. 4): From Table 6, we
obtain that with both HC and VC, HCD ¼ 8 d−Að Þr 9−1=kð Þ−4 and HCC ¼ 4 d−Að Þr 8−1=kð Þ−2. The HC
level in the decentralized cooperative is higher than in the centralized cooperative when
8 d−Að Þ
r 9−1=kð Þ−4 >
4 d−Að Þ
r 8−1=kð Þ−2⇔2r 8−
1
k
 
−4 > r 9− 1k
 
−4⇔16− 2k > 9−
1
k⇔k >
1
7. Therefore,
when k > <ð Þ 17, the HC level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than
in the centralized cooperative.
From Table 6, we obtain that with both HC and VC, VCD ¼ 2 d−Að Þk 9−4=rð Þ−1 and
VCC ¼ 2 d−Að Þk 8−2=rð Þ−1. The VC level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the
centralized cooperative when 2 d−Að Þk 9−4=rð Þ−1 <
2 d−Að Þ
k 8−2=rð Þ−1⇔k 8−
2
r
 
−1 < k 9− 4r
 
−1⇔8− 2r
< 9− 4r⇔r > 2. Therefore, when r > (<)2, the VC level is higher (lower) in the
centralized structure than in the decentralized structure.
Proof Proposition 6 From Table 6, we obtain that with both HC and VC, QD
¼ 6 d−Að Þ9−4=r−1=k and QC ¼ 4 d−Að Þ8−2=r−1=k. The production level is higher in the decentralized
cooperative than in the centralized cooperative when 6 d−Að Þ9−4=r−1=k >
4 d−Að Þ
8−2=r−1=k⇔
3
9−4=r−1=k >
2
8−2=r−1=k⇔k >
2r
15r−2.
Proof Proposition 7 From Table 6, we obtain that with both the equilibrium HC and
VC, πD ¼ d−Að Þ
2 18−16=r−1=kð Þ
9−4=r−1=kð Þ2 and πC ¼
2 d−Að Þ2
8−2=r−1=kð Þ. The profit level is higher in the
decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative when d−Að Þ
2 18−16=r−1=kð Þ
9−4=r−1=kð Þ2
> 2 d−Að Þ
2
8−2=r−1=kð Þ⇔ 18kr−16krð Þ 8kr−2k−rð Þ > 2 9kr−4k−rð Þ2⇔ − 20r −18
 
k2 þ 10þ 2r
 
k−1 > 0⇔ 20r þ 18
 
k2− 10þ 2r
 
k þ 1 < 0. The roots of the equation 20r þ 18
 
k2−
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10þ 2r
 
k þ 1 ¼ 0 a r e k ¼ 5rþ1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r w h e n r∈ 0;
1
7 5−3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p  
or r∈
1
7 5þ 3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 
;∞
 
: Due to the conditions of k and r, see footnote 3, r is larger than
1
7 5−3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 
, hence r∈ 0; 17 5−3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p  
is eliminated. Therefore, when 5rþ1−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r
< k < 5rþ1þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7r2−10rþ1p Þ
20þ18r and r∈
1
7 5þ 3
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p 
;∞
 
; the profit level is higher in the
decentralized cooperative than the centralized cooperative.
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